This paper investigates the heterogeneity of ethnic employment gaps using a new single-index based approach. Instead of stratifying our sample by age or education, we study ethnic employment gaps along a continuous measure of employability, the employment probability minority workers would have if their characteristics were priced as in the majority group.
Introduction
In the United States as well as in Europe, there exist large ethnic differentials in wages and employment rates (Altonji and Blank, 1999; Algan, Dustmann, Glitz, and Manning, 2010) . If the ethnic gaps in wages are large in magnitude, a major part of these can be explained by differentials in workers' characteristics.
1 In contrast, a large part of ethnic employment gaps remains unexplained by skill differentials, as stressed by Ritter and Taylor (2011) . In the French case, Aeberhardt, Fougère, Pouget, and Rathelot (2010) study ethnic wage gaps between French individuals of African origin and French individual of French origin correcting for employment selection. They find that a detailed description of the latest obtained degree, together with age, accounts for the entire wage gap, but only for a third of the unemployment gap. Despite these empirical facts, both empirical and theoretical literatures dealing with ethnic differentials on the labor market have focused on wage gaps and the issue of employment gaps has been relatively neglected (see Charles and Guryan, 2011; Lang and Lehmann, 2011) .
2
This paper aims to develop a new empirical framework to study the heterogeneity of ethnic employment gaps, and provides results using French data. While average measures give a broad picture of labor market differentials, studying their heterogeneity is interesting for two reasons. First, policy-makers may be interested in identifying who are the subgroups suffering from the highest gaps on the labor market. Second, because the economic phenomena underlying these differentials
have not yet been entirely understood, obtaining new empirical facts may shed a new light on existing theoretical models and foster theoretical innovation. As it is the case for average measures, the heterogeneity of ethnic differentials on the labor market has mostly been studied on the wage dimension. Several empirical papers focus on sub-populations, high-skill Taylor, 2006, 2008; Bjerk, 2007) or low-skill workers (Chandra, 2000) : ethnic wage gaps tend to be smaller for high-skill workers.
3 Much less attention has been paid to ethnic 1 Neal and Johnson (1996) stress the roles of verbal and mathematical skills and Black, Haviland, Sanders, and Taylor (2006) those of detailed degrees and fields of specialization for highly educated workers.See also Lang and Manove (2011) for a discussion.
2 Notable counter-examples include Flanagan (1976) , Abowd and Killingsworth (1984) , Cain and Finnie (1990) , Welch (1990) , Bound and Freeman (1992) , Stratton (1993) , Darity and Mason (1998) , Fairlie and Sundstrom (1999) or Couch and Fairlie (2010) . 3 Other papers make use of the decomposition technique developed in (Fortin, Lemieux, employment differentials. To our knowledge, Johnson and Neal (1998) is the only contribution in which ethnic employment gaps are stratified according to individual skills: they find that "a college degree has a greater effect on the employment opportunities of Black workers", which means that lower ethnic employment gaps are expected among college graduates. Figure 1 reports the raw employment gaps between French men with North African parents and French men with French parents, by level of education (left) and by age (right) and provides some preliminary evidence about the heterogeneity of ethnic employment gaps. There are large differences with respect to education:
highly educated workers experience lower employment gaps than less-educated ones. The gap also looks slightly lower for middle-aged workers. Pushing the analysis beyond a few subgroups is difficult. As the number of suband Firpo, 2011): Heywood and Parent (2012) focus on performance pay jobs and show that Black/White wage differentials grow with earnings, whereas in non-performance pay jobs, those differentials go to zero.
groups increases, the precision of the results drops. Our approach is to sum up all the relevant covariates into a single index. We estimate a model of employment on the majority population and use parameter estimates to predict for all individuals a continuous measure of employability, which is the employment probability as predicted from a worker's characteristics if those were valued as in the majority group. Then, we study the ethnic employment gaps along this score, comparing majority and minority workers with similar employability. The approach relies on a conditional independence assumption (CIA), which amounts to assuming that majority and minority workers do not have systematic different unobservable determinants of employment. As far as we know, the approach we propose is new.
Studies in the treatment effect literature usually analyze treatment heterogeneity along treatment probability (i.e. propensity score) or use subgroup analyses (i.e.
along one-dimensional X). Our approach is in contrast related to the growing interest on studying heterogeneous treatment effects across other dimensions. Another contribution of this text is to study transitions into and from employment along employability.
Applying this approach to French men with North African and native origins, we document that the unexplained employment gap is large for workers with low employability and decreases with employability. We decompose this gap between hiring and exit gaps and find that both play important roles in explaining the employment gap, but exit gaps seem to matter more than hiring gaps for most of workers. We also document that the ratio of exit rates between the minority and the majority seems to be clearly constant along the employability score. For the ratio of hiring rates, point estimates suggest that the hiring rate ratio increases for low levels of employability and then decreases for higher ones but we cannot statistically reject that it is in fact constant.
Finally, we interpret these empirical results in light of theory. A simple inflowoutflow model shows that, even when hiring and exit rate ratios are constant, employment gaps can be heterogeneous. Then, we investigate which hiring discrimination mechanisms may help us in explaining our empirical findings. Our ambition is purely illustrative and we do not pretend to provide formal tests about which discrimination types are at stake. We develop a screening model in a taste-based vs. a statistical discrimination framework. We find that the shape of the hiring rate ratio curve found in the empirical part is easiest to reconcile with a model of statistical discrimination where minority applicants have a noisier signal than majority ones. In a last theoretical part, we provide two frameworks in which exit rates can differ across ethnic groups. Adding a second signal draw while the worker is on the job can generate ethnic gaps in exit rates in the case of statistical discrimination. Alternatively, a search model with risk-averse workers predicts that minority workers are more likely to accept jobs with higher exit rates.
Our study is related to a recent literature that aims at understanding the channels underlying ethnic differentials in France. The results obtained by Tô (2014) on the heterogeneity of the ethnic wage gap suggest the existence of statistical discrimination. 4 In contrast, Adida, Laitin, and Valfort (2014) provide evidence that anti-Muslim discrimination in France is at least partly taste-based, and Combes, Decreuse, Laouénan, and Trannoy (2014) find evidence in favor of customer discrimination against African immigrants. Finally, using a correspondence study, Edo, Jacquemet, and Yannelis (2014) find that large unexplained gaps remain in hiring probabilities once statistical discrimination related to language ability is accounted for.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the French Labor Force Survey (LFS) from 2005 to 2011, as well as some summary statistics.
In Section 3, we introduce the empirical methodology. Section 4 provides the main empirical results, which evidence the heterogeneity of the ethnic employment gap.
In Section 5, we discuss our empirical findings in the light of classical theoretical frameworks.
Data and descriptive statistics
The analysis is conducted using the French Labor Force Survey (LFS), undertaken by INSEE. We use the data collected from 2005Q1 to 2011Q4 as, since 2005 only, the LFS contains information on the parents' nationalities at birth and countries of birth. The children of immigrants from a given country can therefore be identified as well as their parents' nationality at birth, and parents' country of birth.
4 Gobillon, Meurs, and Roux (2015) develop a different method to account for observables in the analysis of wage gaps along the distribution of wages, which could be applied to ethnic gaps.
The LFS also contains a precise description of the individual status on the labor market as well as information on socio-demographic characteristics -age, gender, qualification, family characteristics. Around 70,000 individuals aged more than 15 are interviewed each quarter for six quarters in a row.
As we wish to focus on labor-demand issues, we only keep males aged 15 to 50 who are not students. The human-capital attributes observed in the data are the age (or the potential experience) and education. Ability measures, such as IQ or AFQT scores, are not available in this dataset. However, education is described in a precise way: both the level and the field of the highest degree obtained are provided. We build 20 categories of education combining the highest degree's level and major (see Table   1 ). We also rely on parents' occupations or former occupations, which are likely to be correlated with some dimensions of unobserved ability. [Insert here Table 2] We carry out the comparison of groups D and F by performing a classical decomposition of the mean of the employment differentialà la Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) . The average employment rate in the majority population is 87%
while it is equal to 64% in the minority population. In this decomposition as well as in the remainder of the text, we consider the majority group as the reference group. Using the returns estimated on population F , the counterfactual mean employment probability for population D is equal to 81%. The raw gap of 22
percentage points (pp.) can then be decomposed into two parts: 6.5 pp. (30%) are explained by the differences in observable characteristics while 15.5 pp. (70%) 6 We tried to introduce them in alternative specifications and results were not qualitatively affected.
are not.
Using the same specification, we can repeat the exercise by subgroup defined either by the highest degree achieved or by age (Figure 2 ). Compared to Figure   1 , Figure 2 adds a decomposition with respect to observables (parental socioeconomic backgroup as well as remaining heterogeneity in education and age).
We find that ethnic employment differentials are not homogeneous and vary by age and education. More educated and middle-aged groups seem to experience a lower employment gap, both in raw terms and after controlling for differences in observable characteristics. Notes: The decomposition of employment gaps into explained and unexplained is based on Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, using parental socio-economic background, age and education as workers' characteristics. Confidence intervals with 95% coverage level for the explained part of the gap are reported in brackets.
In Figure 3 , each dot represents an age × education cell. The position of the dot on the x-axis is given by the employment rate of the individuals of group F whose characteristics belong to the cell, while the position on the y-axis is given by the mean employment of individuals of group D that belong to the cell. The points to the right of the figure correspond to more experienced and more educated individ-uals who have a higher probability of employment. The overall message is that, for subgroups characterised by higher levels of employment, the ethnic employment gap is lower. One drawback of this figure is that cutting the sample into subgroups increases the noise within each cell. 7 The following section presents a statistical framework to study the heterogeneity of employment gaps and introduces a new single-indexbased method that allows us to obtain results that are less affected by noise.
Methodology

Discrimination in a potential outcome framework
We use the potential outcome model of Rubin (1974) . Let Y i be a binary outcome variable, here, the employment status, and X i the characteristics of individual i.
7 To maintain a sufficient number of observations per cell in Figure 3 , the education covariate was grouped into 8 positions instead of 21.
We want to understand how the binary variable T i affects the binary outcome Y i .
In our case, T denotes the population group: 
The usual decomposition-of-the-mean approach (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973) consists in estimating E(Y i (F )|X i ) on population F (for instance with a probit or logit model) and using the return estimates to predict
directly estimated by the corresponding empirical means in populations F and D.
This decomposition can be interpreted when there is no difference between the minority and the majority populations in unobservable abilities correlated with the outcome once conditioned on observables. This conditional independence as-
Whether they explicitly state it or not, all studies which deal with wage or employment differentials between groups have to rely on such an ignorability assumption, conditional on observable characteristics.
With this assumption, a natural way to study the heterogeneity of employment
, ∀x, which is called the conditional average treatment effect, see e.g. Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) .
Under the CIA, the first term of this difference is equal to E(Y i |X i = x, F ) and can be estimated on population F . 8 Figure 3 provides an empirical counterpart 
are very close for characteristics associated with high employment probability. Although this approach is theoretically sufficient to study the hetero-geneity of employment gaps, the credibility of the CIA often requires to include a large number of covariates in the model.
As more covariates are included, the number of individuals by cell rapidly decreases and the preceding approach leads to very imprecise conditional gap estimates between groups. The usual solution was proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and consists in conditioning on the propensity score rather than on the full set of covariates. Studying the heterogeneity of the treatment effect along the propensity score makes sense in cases when individuals select themselves into the treatment (based on some unobservables) as one may expect then that two individuals with similar scores would benefit from the treatment in similar proportions.
Employment gaps along the employability score
A more natural dimension to study the heterogeneity of the ethnic employment gap is the outcome probability line e F (X) = P (Y (F ) = 1|X), that we hereafter call for simplicity the employability score. Worker i's employability score is equal
, where i's characteristics are priced as in the reference population F . Employability score is a single-index-based measure that sums up all X in one dimension. One can interpret the employability as a measure for the workers' proximity to employment when individual characteristics are valued as in the majority group.
Our theoretical contribution is actually more general. We show that in case of a binary outcome and under the CIA, the outcome probability score (employability) provides, as the propensity score, a unidimensional score that summarizes the CIA (see proof A.1 in the Appendix):
which entails
This provides a statistical justification for the choice of the employability as the conditioning variable. 9 One may also note that the information about the heterogeneity of treatment along the employability score is not redundant with the one along the propensity score. See Appendix B for a discussion of similarities and differences between the propensity and employability scores.
Note that our approach is related to the growing interest on studying heterogeneous treatment effects across other dimensions. Athey and Imbens (2015) , amongst others, apply machine learning methods to determine the sub-groups (and the x) for whom the treatment has the strongest effects, and enhance heterogeneous treatment estimation. As reviewed by Wooldridge (2009), Dehejia (2005) , Manski (2000 Manski ( , 2002 Manski ( , 2004 , Hirano and Porter (2005) develop decision-making approaches in which administrators of programs decide to assign new individuals to a treatment or a control groups based on how much the latter are likely to benefit from the program given some prior information.
Estimation in practice
The first step consists in estimating employability score e F = P (Y (F ) = 1|X) as a function of the observables, using the logit model presented in section 2. In a second step, we compute the employability score of each individual of population (Aeberhardt and Rathelot, 2013) . If cultural transmission were a substantial driver of the employment, we would have expected to see much larger raw and unexplained gaps for females.
One strand of the literature has attempted to deal with these issues by including some kind of IQ measure among covariates (Neal and Johnson, 1996; Lang and Manove, 2011 In the case of France, Aeberhardt, Fougère, Pouget, and Rathelot (2010) show that controlling for the same covariates as the ones we use in this study explains the entire ethnic wage gap (but not the employment gap), even when selection issues are accounted for. This result can be considered as additional suggestive evidence that the covariates used here can do a decent job making the CIA hold. percentage points) and insignificant, although the confidence intervals are also too large to allow us to conclude that the gap converges to zero.
Ethnic differentials in the flows from and into employment
Differences in employment rates can be linked to differences in the hiring rates or in the exit rates.
In this section, we analyze the levels of ethnic differentials regarding inflow and outflow rates and their heterogeneity along the employability score.
The share of employed people moving quarterly out of employment is quite low:
2.7% in the majority group. The raw ethnic gap in the outflow rate is relatively high, 4 percentage points, which means that the exit rate is overall 3 times higher in the minority than in the majority group. The unexplained gap is still quite sub- .5 for hiring rates, and when it remains below .95 for exit rates.
Overall, for both groups, the hiring rates are increasing with employability while the exit rates are decreasing. We now examine the ratios of hiring/exit rates between the two groups. Figure 7 replicates Figure 6 with rescaled majority rates to ease comparisons with minority ones: in the left panel the majority hiring rate is divided by 1.5, in the right panel, the majority exit rate is multiplied by 1.6.
Although we cannot statistically reject that it is constant along the employability score, the general shape of the curve given by point estimates suggests that, if anything, the hiring rates ratio may increase up to an employability score of .8 and may decrease above (Finding 2) Results are more clear-cut concerning the exit rates ratio. The ratio between the minority and the majority exit rates appears to be constant with employability (Finding 3).
The contributions of inflows and outflows to employment gaps
Are the results on the flows consistent with the ones on the employment rates? In order to answer this question, we have to add some structure to the data. Suppose that individuals, given their characteristics, have a specific hiring rate h and exit rate q. Then, at the steady state, their employment probability will be:
We can compare the average employment rate observed in the data and the steadystate rate based on the average values of the hiring and exit rates. In the majority group, the employment rate is equal to 87% while the steady-state rate would be 88% (based on an average hiring rate equal to 0.198 and an average exit rate equal to 0.027). In the minority group, the employment rate is equal to 64% while the steady-state rate would be 65% (based on an average hiring rate equal to 0.125 and an average exit rate equal to 0.067). Interestingly, the employment rates in the data are really close to the steady-state values predicted using the hiring and exit rates. Now, we disentangle the contribution of inflows and outflows to the total ethnic employment gap by a simple counterfactual exercise. Keeping the hiring rate at the level of the majority group and plugging the minority exit rate leads to a counterfactual steady-state employment rate of 75%, 14 percentage points lower than the steady-state employment rate in the majority. Conversely, keeping the exit rate of the majority group and plugging the minority hiring rate leads to a counterfactual rate of 82%, only 6 percentage points less than the steady-state rate in the majority. The ethnic differentials in exit rates seem to explain a larger Notes: Employability is based on the estimation of a logit on the majority population.
The hiring and exit probabilities in the minority group are smoothed using cubic splines with 4 degrees of freedom.
part of the raw employment gap than those in hiring rates.
Finally, we can perform the same counterfactual exercise conditional on employability. Figure 8 shows the predicted steady-state employment probability h/(q +h)
at each level of employability, isolating the contributions of the hiring and of the exit rates. Both differentials in hiring and exit rates seem to importantly contribute to the employment gap at each level of employability. Exit rates seem to contribute a little more for higher levels of employability whereas gaps in hiring rates contribute more for lower levels. As 90% of the minority workers have an employability score above .6 (see Figure 8) , differentials in exit rates are, for most of workers, more important than differentials in hiring rates to explain ethnic employment gaps (Finding 4).
Summary of the empirical findings
Our empirical analysis leads to the following main findings: Notes: The employability score is based on the estimation of a logit on the majority population. The steady-state employment probabilities in the minority group are computed mixing the values of the hiring and exit rates in both groups, for each level of employability, before being smoothed using cubic splines with 4 degrees of freedom.
1. The employment gap tends to decrease with employability, especially for workers above the median of employability (Finding 1).
Hiring rates are increasing with employability. The ethnic differential in
hiring rates is around 5 percentage points and the ratio between the majority and the minority rates is roughly constant with employability, around 1.6
(Finding 2).
Exit rates are decreasing with employability. The ethnic differential in exit
rates is around 5 percentage points and the ratio between the minority and the majority rates is constant with employability, around 1.5 (Finding 3).
4. While both the ethnic differentials in hiring and exit rates play a role in explaining the employment gap, differentials in exit rates seem to matter more, for most of workers (Finding 4).
Interpretation
In this section, we interpret our empirical results in light of theoretical models.
First, we develop the inflow-outflow model evoked above to show that the heterogeneity of the employment gap is compatible with a very simple model in which the underlying process generating the differences between groups is homogeneous (Findings 1, 2 and 3). Second, we investigate whether, if one was ready to interpret the unexplained employment gaps as the result of hiring discrimination, Findings 1 and 2 could be helpful to learn about the type of discrimination.
Third, we present two simple theoretical frameworks to explain how ethnic gaps in exit rates (Findings 3 and 4) can be generated.
Constant ratios of flow rates lead to heterogeneous employment gaps
Using the same inflow-outflow model as before, we can combine the following two equations,
leading to a relationship between the steady-state employment rate in the minority group and (steady-state) employability:
As discussed above, our data are consistent with the fact that ratios
are roughly constant. Constant ratios in inflow and outflow rates, lead to a simplified form for the relationship between the minority employment rate and their employability:
where the parameter α, according to our rough estimates based on the curves, would be around 2.4.
We can perform a more formal test of α being constant. Without loss of generality, we can rewrite e F (x) = where ζ(x) = log(h D /q D q F /h F ). Exploiting the logit form of these expressions, we estimate
In this model ζ (or equivalently α) being constant corresponds to β D −0 = 0 (constant excluded). We perform a LR test of this condition and find a p-value of .09 meaning that the null hypothesis of a constant α cannot be rejected at a conventional level.
While this framework is silent about the mechanisms that generate the differences between minority and majority groups in terms of hiring and exit rates, it is useful to understand that homogeneous mechanisms (i.e. leading to constant ratios) are empirically consistent with heterogeneous employment rates along the employability score (Figure 9) . In other terms, even if high-skill minority workers face the same amount of hiring discrimination as low-skill ones, as measured by h D /h F , the resulting employment gap will be ultimately lower for the former than for the latter. In this framework, Findings 1, 2 and 3 are consistent with each other.
The rest of this section is more prospective. We derive simple setups in which different types of discrimination are at stake in order to compare their predictions to our empirical findings. Our ambition is not to provide statistical tests about discrimination type but only to illustrate our empirical findings.
What can we learn about the type of hiring discrimination from our empirical findings?
Our main insight regarding the type of discrimination comes from a screening framework at the hiring stage that leads to predictions on the hiring rates ratio h D /h F as a function of the employability score e F .
In this framework, productivity is only partially observed and the screening mechanism goes as follows. A worker belonging to group T = D, F , has quality y, and x = E(y|X) sums up the information on quality provided by his observable characteristics. x is observed both by the econometrician and employers. y can be rewritten as y = x + ε, where ε is the unobservable part of quality and is assumed to be normally distributed as a N (0, ω 2 ) in both groups. When employers screen applicants for a given job, they observe a signalε = ε + η. η is a screening error assumed to be independent of ε and its distribution is assumed to depend on the worker's group. The screening error is distributed as a N (0, σ 2 F ) in group F and T + ω 2 If µ > 0, employers make a systematic error on the assessment of the productivity of minority workers (which is only plausible if, at the equilibrium, they do not have the opportunity to refine this prior very often). This is a simple case of statistical discrimination, which we call hereafter statistical discrimination in means. The distribution of η depends on the group T and we assume that σ D > σ F . For instance, this will be the case if the screening process is less precise for minority than for majority applicants because employers mainly belong to the majority group. σ D > σ F thus generates statistical discrimination in variances. With either µ > 0 or σ D > σ F , minority workers will pass the cut less often than the ones from the majority.
We assume that employers are willing to hire all job seekers whose expected productivity is above a given threshold c, which we assume to be constant with x for simplicity. In this framework, taste-based discrimination can be modelled as a utility loss δ for employers. They require therefore a threshold c D for minority applicants, which is higher than c and determined by:
Considering separately each of the three discrimination mechanisms, we obtain theoretical predictions about how the ratio of the hiring rates h D /h F varies with x, (see proofs A.3-A.6 in Appendix).
Taste-based discrimination or statistical discrimination in means.
If σ D = σ F = σ and either δ > 0 or µ > 0 then h D /h F increases with x. 3. Productivity and employability. If q is constant or decreases in x, then the employment probability e F increases in x The first two results provide predictions about how h D /h F varies with observable productivity, under the polar cases of pure taste-based or statistical discrimination. The third result shows that these relationships hold when employability is used instead of productivity.
Many papers in the literature assume that the screening process is likely to be more efficient as the skill level of the worker increases (see Arcidiacono, Bayer, and Hizmo, 2010 or Lang and Manove, 2011) , so that both σ F and σ D would decrease with x. To avoid any strong stance on how the ratio should vary with x, we assume, for the second result, that σ D /σ F is constant with x but have to acknowledge that the empirical literature is silent about this, so far.
Our first theoretical prediction states that in simple models of taste-based discrimination or statistical discrimination on the means, the hiring ratio h D /h F should be increasing. The second one states that in a simple statistical discrimination framework in which the variance of the signal differ across ethnic groups, this same ratio should increase at lower levels of x and decrease above a certain threshold. While our empirical result do not allow us to exclude any of these two patterns, we note that the point estimates of the hiring rates are compatible with the increasing-then-decreasing-ratio story.
This exercise should not be taken as formal evidence in favor of statistical discrimination on the signalling variance, as it is probably possible to construct other models of discrimination that would lead to different predictions in terms of how the ratio varies with productivity. However, we think that it is illustrative of the fact that studying the heterogeneity of labor-market differentials might provide additional testable predictions about the mechanisms underlying discrimination.
Micro-founding the ethnic gap in exit rates
In this section, we review two theoretical frameworks that may help explain differentials in exit rates (Finding 3).
Two-stage screening model
Here, we explicitly model the destruction of the job match in the screening model developped above. It is usual in the matching literature to endogenize the timing of the match destruction by assuming that the productivity varies according to some random process and that the match does not survive under a certain threshold. If productivity is perfectly observed, an obvious modeling choice is to have the random process depend on ethnicity. More interestingly, when productivity is not perfectly observed and employers learn about employees over time, new information about the worker's productivity can lead to a dismissal. As minority workers' initial signals are more noisy, new signals are more likely to reveal very low productivity. Therefore, the revelation of information about productivity can result in a higher termination rate for minority workers.
To understand under which conditions this may happen, we add a second stage to the screening framework in which a new signal is drawn. After a given period of time, which may depend across matches, employers observe a second draw of ε.
This draw is used to refine their prior about the worker's quality and may reveal that some of the workers are not qualified enough for the job. Workers whose revised expected quality do not meet the new threshold are dismissed.
In the presence of statistical discrimination, minority workers are more often misclassified than majority workers. Thus, the exit rate of minority workers will be higher than the one of majority workers. In the presence of taste-based discrimination (without statistical discrimination), misclassification is comparable across groups and there should be no difference in the exit rates of minority and majority workers (see proof A.7 in Appendix). The ethnic gap in the exit rates observed in that data (Finding 3) would lead us to favor that statistical discrimination rather than taste-based discrimination only is involved in the employers' hiring behaviors.
Search model with risk aversion
Ethnic exit rate gaps also appear in frameworks with worker risk aversion. Indeed, one of the most obvious reasons why minority workers would face a higher exit rate is that they have more insecure jobs, which will have on average shorter dura-tions. If workers are risk-averse, the uncertainty about the duration of the job is a dimension that workers will trade off with wages. Workers that are discriminated against may have a higher probability to accept a job with a lower wage but also a job of shorter duration.
In the usual job-search model, workers are risk neutral and their exit rate is exogenous. Introducing variable exit rates across jobs would leave the job-acceptance behavior unchanged in that framework. Therefore, we introduce risk aversion in the search model, and following Pratt (1964) ; Pissarides (1974); Nachman (1975) , we model it in a simple way by introducing a risk-premium term p(q) (increasing in q).
13 Denoting wages as w, the discount rate as r, the present expected utility associated to a job as V e and the present expected utility associated to unemployment as V u , the flow of utility of a worker in a job with wage w and exit rate q will be equal to:
In this context, we can define a reservation utility, and job seekers will only take offers such w − p(q) > rV u . Assume that the minority population faces a lower arrival rate of job offers, the minority workers will accept, on average, jobs with a higher exit rate, even if they face the same distribution of wage and exit rate offers.
In this framework, the differences in exit rates come directly from the differences in the hiring rates.
Concluding comments
In this paper, we describe the heterogeneity of ethnic employment gaps along a continuous dimension: employability, that measures the counterfactual employment probability minority workers would have if their observable skills, namely education and age, were priced as the majority workers' ones. Under a classical conditional independence assumption, our empirical strategy enables us to document unexplained (net-of-composition-effects) ethnic employment gaps along the employability score. We apply this method to the ethnic employment gap concerning French men of North African origin. We find that minority workers with lower 13 p(q) can have a broader sense than just a risk premium and can be seen as a general cost of insecurity. Having a less secure job can have actual consequences: more difficulty to rent a property or to get a loan.
employability suffer from large unexplained gaps, around 20 percentage points.
The unexplained gap decreases unambiguously with employability, to be lower than 5 percentage points at the highest employability scores.
A second empirical contribution is to decompose quarterly transition rates into and from employment: we document how they vary with employability and whether entry or exit matter most to explain employment gaps. We find that, in both groups, hiring rates increase with employability while exit rates decrease with employability. The ratio between the minority and the majority exit rates is clearly constant along the employability score, whereas point estimates for the ratio of hiring rates suggest that it increases for low levels of employability and then decreases for higher ones but we cannot statistically reject that the ratio is in fact constant. Finally, we find that ethnic differentials both in hiring and in exit rates matter for employment gaps, but exit differentials seem to matter more for most of workers.
Simple labor-market models can be used to provide a first interpretation of these results. First, we show that the heterogeneity of the employment gaps do not need to come from heterogenous mechanisms, say, differential discrimination, which would be harsher towards low-employability than high-employability workers. We can generate the pattern of the heterogeneity through a simple inflow-outflow framework in which the ratio of hiring and exit rates are constant. This would for instance be the case if minority workers received say half as many offers as the majority ones.
Then, we investigate whether the new empirical results on the hiring and exit rates can help separate the different sources of discrimination. In a simple screening framework at the hiring stage, we compare the predictions that arise when we introduce statistical or taste-based discrimination. Neither the precision of our empirical results nor the simplicity of our theoretical framework allow us to draw definite conclusions. However, we note that the predictions given by this simple model with statistical discrimination (on the variance of the screening error) matches our point estimates for the pattern of the ratio of hiring rates across ethnic groups, which is increasing then decreasing with employability. More research would be needed to assess the validity of the assumptions of the model and to obtain more precise empirical estimates.
Finally, we provide two simple frameworks to understand ethnic gaps in exit rates, which have not attracted a lot of attention in the literature about ethnic labormarket gaps. We show that differentials in exit rates can be the consequence of noisier signals for minority workers at the hiring stage (compatible with the existence of statistical discrimination). In a search model, the combination of workers' risk aversion and discrimination at the hiring stage can also generate gaps in exit rates when workers self-select into jobs that have a higher probability to be destroyed.
Compliance with Ethical Standards: The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest. Notes: Dummies for calendar quarters (27 without the reference) interacted with dummies for age lower than and greater than 35 are also included in the model but their coefficients are omitted for readibility. * means 10%-significant, ** means 5%-significant and *** means 1%-significant. Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses.
probability distribution function and the cumulative distribution function of a N (0, 1). With these notations E(u|u > γ, x) = λ(γ).
The thresholds c and c D are such that:
. =δ If δ does not depend on x, differentiating this equation with respect to x leads to:
Given that λ /λ is decreasing and that c D > c, we have that:
Combining equations (1) and (2), and given that λ < 0, we obtain:
The ratio of hiring probabilities is equal to:
Differentiating the ratio of employment probabilities by x, we show that the sign of the derivative is the same as the one of:
From equation (3), we find that the ratio h D /h F should be increasing.
A.4 Point 1, Section 5, statistical discrimination in means
. In this case, transformed unobservables u =
are distributed in a N (0, 1) in group F and N (−µ, 1) in group D. We denote λ(.) = ϕ(.)/Φ(.), with ϕ and Φ corresponding to the probability distribution function and the cumulative distribution function of a N (0, 1).
Then:
Differentiating the ratio of employment probabilities by x, and using that c < 0, we find that the sign of the derivative is the same as the one of:
Because −c(x) − µ < −c(x), and λ < 0, we have λ(−c(x) − µ) > λ(−c), so that the ratio h D /h F is increasing.
A.5 Point 2, Section 5
Conditionŷ T > c is equivalent to:
Because u D and u F ∼ N (0, 1),
First consider the situation when σ D and σ F do not vary with x. The derivative of h D h F with respect to x is positive iff:
and as c (
< 0, this is equivalent to:
Noting λ(.) = ϕ(.)/Φ(.), this is itself equivalent to:
If c > 0, that is x < c, we have as k > 1, −kc(x) < −c(x), and as λ(.) is positive and decreasing, λ(−c(x)) < kλ(−kc(x)). Therefore, A.6 Point 3, Section 5
Consider the inflow-outflow equation with e, h and q being functions of x:
e(x) = h(x) h(x) + q (x) .
Taking the derivative with respect to x leads to:
e (x) = h (x)q(x) − q (x)h(x) (h(x) + q(x)) 2 with the previous notations, h(x) = P (u > c(x)) = Φ(−c(x)) which is increasing in x. Therefore, it suffices for e to be increasing in x, that q be non increasing in
x.
A.7 Two-stage screening model
The two-stage screening model corresponds to drawing u 1 , u 2 in a bivariate normal distribution such that u 1 , u 2 ∼ N (0, 1) and cov(u 1 , u 2 ) = ρ T = .
With the previous notations, it follows that:
Φ(−c) .
The denominator does not depend on ρ T , and
T is increasing in ρ T as long as u > ρ T c (which is the case here). P (u 2 > c|u 1 > c) is thus increasing in ρ T , and therefore decreasing in σ T . Minority workers are more likely to be dismissed than majority ones.
B Appendix: Similarities and differences between the propensity and employability scores
The employability score shares similarities with the propensity score but it differs from it. Note first that the employability score is not a balancing score in the sense defined by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) . In general, we do not have X ⊥ T |p(X). To see this, just consider two populations T = 0 and T = 1, and a unique explanatory variable X with values 0 and 1, and taking value 1 with probability q if T = 0 and probability 1 − q if T = 1 (q = 1 − q). Assume also that employment Y is such that P (Y |X, T ) = 1/2 independent of T and X. It follows that T ⊥ X|P (Y |X) = 1/2.
Even if the employability score is not a balancing score, Y (F ) ⊥ T |p(X) entails that conditional treatment effects are identified at any value of p(X). So the employability score provides a different dimension of analysis that is not redundant with nor cannot be summarized in general by the propensity score.
Further, applying the same reasoning as Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) on p(X)
instead of on the propensity score, we can define balancing scores relative to Y , instead of balancing scores relative to T . Let b Y be a balancing score relative to Y , b Y is such that X ⊥ Y |b Y (X). Theorem 2 of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) says that the propensity score e(X) = P (T = 1|X) is the coarsest balancing score in the sense that if b T is a balancing score (relative to T ), then e = f (b T ) for some function f . Considering now Y instead of T , it follows that p(X) = P (Y = 1|X)
is the coarsest balancing score relative to Y .
Theorem 3 of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) says that if treatment assignment is strongly ignorable given X, then it is strongly ignorable given any balancing score b T (X), which holds in particular for the propensity score e(X). Considering again Y instead of T , treatment assignment is also ignorable given any balancing score relative to Y , b Y (X), in particular given the employability p(X).
To justify even more the use of the employability, we show next that it is, with the propensity score, the only other unidimensional score that could lead to the previous results in a general way. It may happen, that in specific situations, other unidimensional scores could summarize the CIA and be good candidates for a conditional analysis, but the only ones that can work on a general basis are the propensity score and the employability. To see that, it is sufficient to find an example in which they are the only valid scores (in the above sense).
Assume that there is one single covariate X, and that Y is such that P (Y = 1|X) = Λ(X), with Λ(x) = exp(x)/(1 + exp(x)), and T is such that P (T = 1|X) = 1 − Λ(X).
Imagine that there is some function g such that Y ⊥ T |g(X) but g is neither a
balancing score relative to Y nor to T : X ⊥ T |g(X) and X ⊥ Y |g(X). This means that there exist x 1 < x 2 , such that g(x 1 ) = g(x 2 ) = γ but P (Y = 1|x 1 ) = P (Y = 1|x 2 ). Given the specific form of Y and T , this also means that P (T = 1|x 1 ) = P (T = 1|x 2 ).
Assume without loss of generality that g = γ ⇒ x ∈ (x 1 , x 2 ) and that X follows a non informative distribution. It follows that P (Y = 1|T = 0, g = γ) < P (Y = 1|T = 1, g = γ). Indeed, with T = 0, it is more likely that x = x 1 than x = x 2 .
This contradicts the fact that Y ⊥ T |g(X). Therefore, in general, the only scores b that are such that Y ⊥ T |b(X) are balancing scores relative to Y or T .
